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Civil and Military Rules in Indonesia

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Abstract

Civil and military relations in Indonesia actually have their own rules. If we examine history, we will find phenomena about the relationship between civilian and military power towards the process of social and political change in Indonesia. This paper aims to identify the rules of civil and military play in Indonesia in particular wanting to track civil and military power relations. This study tries to illustrate how the rules of the game between civilians and the military in Indonesia. This paper uses descriptive qualitative methods with data collection techniques by interview and literature study. This paper shows that civilians and the military have their respective duties in carrying out the mandate of the state, these two positions should not interfere with each other. After the reform of civil and military relations, it looks good. One of the agendas is against the Indonesian Armed Forces Dual Function (ABRI) but today, the issue of ABRI's Dual Function has been transformed into a Military Dual Function, ahead of the 2019 General Election (Election) this issue re-emerges so that it is considered political and becomes part of the project's representation of political interests.

Keywords: Rules of the Game; Civil, Military; Politics.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper intends to identify the civilian and military rule of the game in Indonesia, particularly in tracking civilian and military power relations. Civil and Military are both positions that have political aspects. This position has its territorial boundaries. However, when juxtaposed with social and political phenomena in Indonesia, it seems as if this position does not have territorial boundaries. That is why, identifying civil and military rule of the game in Indonesia, especially in today's political year, must be able to formulate concepts and thinking horizons about civilian and military power relations. An interesting reason for the fact that civilians and military positions do not have territorial boundaries can be seen from the fact that positions in the legal aspect are less binding than in the past. Part of the reason is the increasingly open access to technology.

The world is not yet completely border-free, because state forms still have reasons to maintain control over the movement of people and goods in the interests of public safety and security (Ohmae, 2005). Civil and military positions still appear to have no control to control each other individually or institutionally. One of the aspects that gave rise to this discourse was communication. Communication that has always depended on the territorial boundaries of office, post-reform communication between civilians and the military is quite good this can be seen from the movement of civilians who strongly rejected military dominance. Thus, communication from top to bottom proved able to control the problems that existed at that time.

Communication issues, phenomenon can also be seen from the relationship between the TNI and the National Police, the political dynamics that have lasted almost ten years have resulted in many changes. Security reform does not escape the reform agenda, which continues to be a subject of interesting discussion. One of the debates on

security reform is related to the perception, nature, and scope, management, and actors of national security (Sambuaga, 2007) in (Sudirman, & Fadly, 2018).

Sambuaga wants to illustrate how acute the communication between the TNI and Polri, who have their respective duties and functions, must be perceived that there will be a tug of war that leads to a clash of state security actors. This is not much different when juxtaposed with the phenomenon of civilian and military relations. Civil and military relations in developing countries have one characteristic of their own and are much different from ideal patterns of civil and military relations as developed by western countries are not necessarily suitable to be applied in developing countries such as Indonesia.

Even the military professionalism developed by western scientists as a condition of civil and military relations is seen as something too abstract and vague, and not suitable for developing countries' militaries (Finner, 1962). Samuel P Huntington sees that civil and military relations are cross-border, starting from the military phase as a "conqueror" phase (warrior) in line with a professional military. This was marked by the change from "army of material finances" to "soldiers of holy calling" (Huntington, 1962). Judging from the changing times that have occurred in Indonesia, the process of changing military domination is correct in all aspects. Military groups tend to continue to dominate political power in third-world countries. However, this trend has experienced political ups and downs. Military involvement tends to be dynamic, following the developing political constellation in the country concerned. At one time the military-dominated by strengthening its political grip, sometimes at other times the military was weakened and withdrew from the political sphere and surrendered complete power to the civilian government (Muradi, 2005).

(Sundhaussen, 1986) at least put forward three reasons why the military withdrew from the political sphere. First, the emergence of resistance from civilian elite groups supported by the masses. Second, there is influence from outside (international), where the coalition countries withdraw and encourage resistance to the military regime. Third, the emergence of awareness and internal military circles, for example, recognition of the concept of civilian supremacy, and/or persistence in staying in power. The pattern of relations between civilians and the military still has an ideological tug-of-war with political movements, giving rise to dualism in civilian positions. Describing the nature of civilian and military relations in third world countries into five models, namely personal control (authoritarian-personal rule). Second, authoritarian-mass control. Third, democratic-competitive. Fourth, the civil-military coalition. Fifth, the military oligarchy (Janowitz, 1988).

The ups and downs of military involvement in politics can be identified from the changing times from the old order to the new order. In the era of the old order the military still impressed under the pressure of civilians so as to allow the military to seem to withdraw from the political momentum more focused on carrying out the mandate of the state in order to maintain the security of the country. However, this does not deny that the military is silent military professionalism is increasingly visible. The military clash with the government at that time became a momentum for the military to carry out its political movements, before the collapse of the old order the military's political stance began to look so clear, domination of power thickened when Suharto took the throne.

What was raised by (Sundhaussen, 1986) the reason why the military withdrew from the political arena was due to foreign (international) influence at least occurred during the momentum of Suharto's resignation from the throne of leadership for

32 years. Behind this phenomenon, there is an implicit message that Suharto, with his military strength, was unable to withstand pressures from outside (international) influences

RESEARCH METHOD

This research method uses a descriptive qualitative approach. Descriptive research can be defined as a problem-solving procedure that is investigated by depicting or depicting subjects or objects to social phenomena based on their symptoms (Nawawi, 2019).

The focus of this research is to identify the power relations between civilians and the military which to this day is still a big question mark. The perspective used in this study elaborates on historical reviews and phenomena that occurred in 2019.. This research uses descriptive qualitative data collection techniques using interviews and literature study. This study uses data analysis techniques Miles and Huberman's model. Activities in the qualitative data analysis include data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 2007).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Military In Political Circle

Discourse on the rules of civil and military play in Indonesia, at least the author presents some ideas of experts, individual characteristics of civilian and military leaders have been widely used to explain the rules of the game of civilian and military. (Moskos, 1979) in (Widiasa, 2018) suggested that America's post-cold war problems related to civil and military relations were a result of the Clinton administration's dissatisfaction with military norms and values. Other explanations focus on changes in military organizations. Dengan menggunakan model organisasi militer daUsing the model of the military organization from (Janowitz, 1988), for example, we would predict that civilian control of the United States military would

begin to deteriorate after the implementation of the JCS (Joint Chief of Staff) reforms through the Goldwater-Nicholas Act in the mid-1980s. (Kohn, 1985) connect these post-cold war difficulties with the strengthening of American military unity since Goldwater-Nicholas (Purwo Nugroho, n.d.). On the other hand, (Huntington, 1962). Argues that the higher the professionalism of the military, the better its civil-military relations.

If the above ideas are translated through the situation and conditions in Indonesia, the military control over civilians is the prevailing political situation. There is a tendency that the ruling military regime is also filled with civilians (Janowitz, 1988). This view above predicts that institutional changes in the military such as the ups and downs of unity (unity), changes in culture, or changes in the level of professionalism will strengthen or weaken civilian control. However, according to the view (Desch, 2002) this organizational perspective is also inadequate, because the power of civilian control over the military cannot be understood simply by examining military.

The aspects that exist in a country such as leaders, organizations, military, state structures, and society certainly affect the ability to maintain the consensus of the country. A theory of civilian control over the military that considers individual, military, state, and social variables as they respond to international threats (Desch, 2002) This approach is used in analyzing the role of the military in certain countries; Alfred Stepan noted by (Cullough, 1992) stated that the main task of political sociology regarding the military is to discuss military institutions and political systems and determine how the institutional characteristics, especially of certain military institutions, shape the response to the influence of the political system (Gunawan, 2018). From some of the arguments above it can be said that the power of civilian control over the military in many fundamental countries including Indonesia is formed by structural factors,

especially threats that affect the figure of leaders, military organizations, countries, and societies.

Such a structural theory holds that the roots of patterns of civilian control cannot be completely reduced to the internal attributes of a particular state; because civilian control patterns are formed by the interaction of these internal attributes with the external environment. (Petraeus, 1987) argued, viewing this theory as differently configured units (a unit is a certain state society and a military with certain attributes) in the same structural position will usually behave the same. Like other structural theories, it can predict individual coups or other manifestations of the breakdown of civilian control over militaries; it can only mention the general conditions under which ordinary civilian control deteriorates or increases (Dewantara, 2016).

This theory was tried to be tested by (Lievesley, 1999) who divided the two transition models. First, is the pact model, in which there are various agreements and alliances between old and new political factors to avoid chaos and conflicts that are considered to open up gaps for the return of authoritarian regimes. Classical work of several transition researchers such as O'Donnel, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986), and Karl and Schmitter (1991), many describe this transition model, where there is a relationship of interdependence between civilians, military and political parties, or between state institutions and business actors and labor unions. Second, the radical model which believes that the transition period should be directed towards realizing structural transformation fundamentally in all fields. This model was chosen because of the belief that the demands and expectations of the people will never be controlled only through a limited political process (Ewan dan Morley: 1992) (Tippe, 2017).

In Indonesia, in 1958 the concept of "Middle Way" was proposed by General

Ahmad Nasution to the great revolutionary leader President Soekarno during the anniversary of the National Military Academy (AMN) in Magelang, Central Java on November 13, 1958. This concept provides an opportunity for a limited role for the military in civilian government. Entering the gates of the new order under the leadership of President Soeharto the concept was termed the Dual Function of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI).

Instead, President Suharto formulated the concept to be used as a military justification in increasing his influence in the government. The military can institutionally occupy strategic positions within the government. Strategic positions such as; Ministers, Governors, Regents, and Mayors and enter parliament through the ABRI/TNI FactionI.

We can see that the pattern of political strategy played by the then ruler who was in power for 32 years has managed to change the governance system so quickly. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression was entered for 32 years in a regime under the pretext of development.

The dual-functioning power of ABRI was gradually abolished following the collapse of the Suharto regime, in the era of President KH. Abdurrahman Wahid aka Wahid during a meeting of ABRI leaders in 2000, agreed to remove the doctrine and will begin after the 2004 General Election. In the era of Wahid, he realized that restoring TNI toxic as an institution that has its duty and function is to maintain the resilience and security of the country is certainly not an easy thing.

Although the concept of ABRI's dual function has been abolished, the military may carry out its practice and implementation. The first thing Gus Dur did was evaluate the structural state institutions by separating the TNI Commander and the Minister of Defense. What is interesting is that Gus Dur accommodated Polri by placing a position parallel to the TNI Commander, so that Polri was no longer subordinated to the

TNI, because Gus Dur's main focus was to reposition the TNI without causing turmoil.

In the 2004 elections, Indonesia was led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who was also a former TNI General. At that time, he committed to resigning his post in the military and founding the Democratic Party and stressed that the army was very dangerous to enter into practical politics. Thus, during his tenure, issues regarding ABRI's dual function were barely audible.

This issue surfaced again during a TNI leadership meeting attended by President Joko Widodo when TNI Commander Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto expressed a discourse that he wanted to add new posts for high-ranking officers both internally and in the ministry. Suddenly this statement created a disagreement in the public sphere because it was considered to be able to reactivate the dual function of ABRI, which had long been lost after the collapse of the New Order and was also considered to injure reformation ideals. Therefore, the issue must be digested, analyzed, and then acted upon. Because this issue again raised in line with the anniversary of the five-year democratic party which the author later called a political year.

At that time we saw the devastating influence of military groups in the internal government that ruled for 32 years, the country was such a terrifying scourge. Therefore, the authors see that it is not a matter of reactivation of ABRI's dual function or not but, there is an impression that a dysfunction phenomenon is occurring internally. The author raises a discourse on the dysfunction of ABRI when he examines the statement from the TNI Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto who wants to fill the TNI post.

There is an impression that the TNI is not functioning normally or has disturbed its function internally. So, through today's political momentum, the discourse on ABRI's Dysfunction is as if eliminated, as if it were a living corpse. In general, the TNI Commander wants to provide opportunities for TNI officers to participate in regulating

the government system but forgets that the TNI's duty and function is to maintain the resilience and security of the State.

These tasks and functions must be tested through improving the quality and capacity of the TNI officers' Human Resources (HR) through formal and non-formal education such as war strategies and establishing a Community Research and Development Institute (LITBANG) and others. It cannot be denied that the TNI has so much influence on the state, but that does not mean that the public is prohibited from evaluating every work performance of the TNI.

The rule of the game referred to by the author is to identify patterns of civil and military relations, civilian and military involvement in politics, and civilian control of the military. Thus, it would seem like a way of playing civilian and military in the political area. The discourse that is currently being discussed is the issue of the return of ABRI's dual function, which had long been lost after the collapse of the New Order. However, it does not rule out the possibility that we are currently facing even though we do not bring ABRI's dual function, but the enthusiasm will remain.

According to political observers, Syahrir Karim said that if the Dwifungsi ABRI is correct by focusing on Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI it is considered to harm the ideals of reform by limiting the role of the military in civilian positions. He also said that civil and military relations are good and that must be maintained and should not undermine the spirit of reform. Political year agenda which is full of political and tendentious elements and full of interests. Thus, the military is required to remain focused internally by providing new positions or structural posts for officers or PATI who are non-job and do not have to occupy civilian positions. Here it can be seen that the civil and military rule of the game in the political year can at least be stated as follows; First, based on the structural theory approach, the two positions each wanted to

dominate, but the military tended to be more violent (hard action)..

It can be seen that the level of civilian control over the military varies according to personality, character, and experience, and the figure of military and civilian leaders (Desch, 2002). The statement reinforces today's phenomenon, coupled with entering the political year. The phenomenon of civilian control over the military is certainly determined based on the situation and conditions that occurred at that time. For example, from the personality of the leadership, if the military leadership impressed pro against the ruler then of course it would be inversely proportional if the military leadership counter to the ruler.

The ongoing political phenomenon is determined by the civilian response to civilians and vice versa. During the reign of Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla, who carried a maritime vision, emphasized what President Soekarno had done to strengthen Indonesia's maritime base.

Political vision requires a synergistic concentricity with a maritime vision. There are at least three reasons put forward by (Muradi, 2015). First, the shift of world powers to Asia. This is reflected in how countries in Asia, in particular, are slowly having a world influence. In this context, Indonesia is one of the strategic countries in Asia to take a more effective and important role.

Second, a shift in struggle and conflict, from ideology to the economy of resources. This condition reinforces the belief that Indonesia as a country must take the initiative to undertake a position affirmation process, which is in the context of a maritime country. Hence, Indonesia is strategically emphasizing this by one of them is maintaining and exploring it by one of them is maintaining and exploring economic resources and strength to play a strategic and effective role in the world.

Third, Indonesia's strategic position between two continents and two oceans confirms that from a long time ago, both the

Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Demak Kingdom eras were inseparable parts of Indonesian history. Because of this strategic position, it must be admitted that Indonesia's existence as a maritime country has not been fully explored. The perspective of the state leadership for the past 50 years has mostly referred to the concept of an archipelago and territorial-based state. So, it is not surprising that in practice Indonesia has even become a maritime country that has not fully explored and utilized it for broader interests, both in the economic, political, and security fields.

In this context, military doctrine can influence civilian control through the establishment of a military organizational structure. As stated by Andreski in (Desch, 2002): here is an intrinsic discrepancy between the internal and external use of the armed forces. In other words, the more often the armed forces are used internally, the less capable they are to fight, and secondly (when the ratio of military participation is high) the more intensive or recently the more often the military is involved in warfare, the less responsibility and reliability it will be as a means of internal repression.

Lastly, military doctrine can influence civilian control where the military is the focal point for the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas about the use of forces and the external environment. Huntington argues that much of the civilian relationship of the United States can be explained by a clash between two fundamentally different mindsets: military realism and civil liberalism, the former is based on a skeptical view of human nature, prioritizes the interests of society over individual interests, values order, and hierarchy, assumes the centrality of the nation-state and military power in international relations supports the discriminatory use of forces and affirms strict segregation between the "world" "military" and "civilians".

In contrast, civilian liberalism usually opposes the use of force, supports the elimination of force or maximum use and

force, and regards the military as a potential threat to freedom, prosperity, democracy, and peace (Huntington, 1962). In a challenging external security environment, civilian and military ideas will converge in realism. In a less dangerous environment, civil liberalism is more likely to emerge and conflict with military realism, weakening civilian control. In this case, one thing that wants to be identified from the rule of the game from civilian and military is the extent of civilian control over the military.

In addition, the civil and military rules of the game will be visible from the system prevailing in certain countries. In Indonesia, which adheres to a democratic system, this system will describe things that are different from civilian control over the military and military control over civilians. The transition to democracy is so much that the key to maintaining democracy is strong civilian control over the military. Unfortunately, the transitional literature did not give birth to theories about the role of civil and military relations. Thus, this should be identified in-depth.

Is the military an independent agent, or is it just a reflection of social power? The solution to this problem lies in the search for a generalized theoretical platform that explicitly incorporates the military into the broader process of political change (Desch, 2002). One of the most convincing is Guillermo O'Donnel's argument about the rise of authoritarian bureaucratic regimes. This model rests on four different threats to dependency theory; Samuel Huntington's criticism of modernization theory; organizational theory; and Alexander Gerschenkron and Albert Hirschman's theory of the political consequences of various stages of industrialization (O'Donnel, 1978) in (Ma'arif, 2017).

O'Donnel's most recent observation is, in contrast to the widespread assumption, that modernization did not give birth to democracy in its emergence. On the other hand, at least in southern Latin America,

there is a kind of affinity between high levels of modernization and authoritarian regimes.

O'Donnel's observation above, when drawn into Indonesia, shows that this phenomenon occurred when the 32-year government was led by Suharto who was considered an authoritarian regime. At that time, the formulation of these doctrines in themselves did not bind all officers automatically and without reservation to the policies of the new order, the doctrines themselves in the end provide little guidance for the overwhelming majority of officers in all armed forces who generally remain professional and politically inactive or less binding on a particular establishment, and who with great relief welcome the device of muscular principles, which allow them to remain free from having to make difficult political decisions (Sundhaussen, 1986).

Civilians Consolidation and Military

In this discussion, the authors initiate a statement (Wahid, 1999). He stated that it is estimated that the political parties will one time win the election. It is also estimated that a joint TNI Chief of Staff institution will be formed which will be led in turn by each force. When the Political Parties and the TNI are unable to consolidate politics, neither party will be able to make long-term economic policies, so as a result the Indonesian economy will be managed ad hoc and dictated by the capital market, financial market, and commodity market.

In this phase, consolidation related to civil and military issues is certainly a must in looking at the era of Consolidation of Indonesia in the next few years. The involvement of civilian and military groups is critical to a serious form of concern. Because from the historical perspective of Indonesia's independence the two positions are actively involved. Coupled with the involvement of these two positions to the leadership issue.

Talking about the civil and military discourse will touch on two topics, namely civil-military and militarism. The discourse

on civil and military relations appears to be to locate the most appropriate relationship functionally between civilian and military, to prevent the emergence of militarism. To get a proper understanding of this discourse, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the notion of civil and military relations. Civil relations need to be understood in terms of the distribution of authority and political power, especially in a democratic political system. Democracy rests on the sovereignty of the people, which in turn, through general elections, the people determine their choice to exercise power to exercise executive power and to jointly make laws and exercise control over the executive in the legislative power (Widjojo, 2015).

Civil and military relations are so important. This is because the military is a component in a country that is given monopoly rights to use weapons of violence funds to carry out defense functions based on government political decisions. Monopoly using weapons and violence should not be mixed with political power because they are against democratic principles. However, especially in countries with developing democracies, the military is still in competition to be used as a political tool to support their power (Widjojo, 2015).

In this context, we need to understand the pattern of relations between civilian authorities and military components, the civilian political authority which has the power to administer the state will determine when the military is used, for what military purposes it is used. This factor must be accounted for again to the people as the mandate for the borrower of power. On the other hand, military duty is related to the above political authority, which is to choose the most appropriate strategy/tactic/method to carry out tasks in the context of achieving national political goals, and to provide guidance/management of all military forces so that whenever necessary, the task is always in a state of readiness (Muradi, 2014).

The concept of the TNI has been put forward by (Janowitz, 1988) which states that military organization is a reflection of role technology. Hasnan Habib seems to be in line with this concept, he states that an organization is the ratio d'etre to face and overcome emergencies (emergency organization) which is characterized by a tough, strict, hierarchical centralistic organization, strict discipline, and moves under command. This characteristic is a habit formation. Meanwhile, Uhlin described the characteristic of a military organization as being very hierarchical and authoritarian in Cholis (2002) in (Ibrahim, 2012). Ideally, the military conception is based on its duties and functions as a state power in maintaining resilience and security. Michael C. Desch calls it a military doctrine, it reveals the environment of dangerous external threats (defined by participation in war) and military-civilian relations in the absence of a coup.

Military concepts are always faced with civilians, this phenomenon does tend to be biased if it is not properly understood the meaning and meaning of the concept. This concept imposes an issue that is present in the pattern of relations between civilians and the military, namely Dwifungsi. Dwifungsi study tested through power with subject patterns (military) and objects (civilian). The spectrum that originated from the thought that comes from the old state in Dwifungsi has not been abandoned at all, in line with the fact that the new state has not been organized in the post-Dwifungsi era. Representing the old state we still see old concepts such as the existence of the ABRI/TNI Faction in the House of Representatives, the efficacy of the TNI-Rakyat, territorial concepts, and the position of the TNI that "maintains balance with all parties" which refers to the Dwifungsi.

However, on the other hand, we see from the beginning that concepts that are not present in the doctrine of Dwifungsi have been introduced, such as civil-military relations, civil supremacy, and political

authority. At this early stage concepts based on democratic rules and have relevance to the implementation of defense functions or with the TNI as the executor of the main functions of defense, may not have been given articulation about its implementation, but has consistently been introduced. Therefore, the time represents that the stage of introduction of ideas related to the implementation of defense functions, and the TNI becomes the main executor of defense functions as part of the practice of a democratic political system (Widjojo, 2015).

Widjojo wants to warn that in public spaces today there are still many misinterpretations of the conception of the military, especially when juxtaposed with Dwifungsi. A lack of understanding of the military conception will intensify hatred among the military. However, what is at issue is the method of articulating the relationship between the military and the people. From the very beginning, concepts that were not contained in doctrine were introduced..

That is, in the momentum of the political year. Military groups must be neutral, military impartiality can only be seen when there is a threat to the country, both from outside (international) and inside. Civilians are only a means of controlling the military movement so that it is not achieved the name of militarism. Because in a democratic country one of its instruments is freedom. Therefore, military boundaries must be controlled let alone entered the realm of political momentum.

CONCLUSION

From the results of the description above, it can be concluded that the identification of the rules of the game of civilians and the military has an instrument that these two positions have their own toxic in safeguarding the sovereignty of the people. Civilians and military as stakeholders are sovereigns by the community both through the political process and culturally, organization. After

the collapse of the new order and the coming reform period, civil and military relations seemed to be doing well. But today, the issue of the return of dwifungsi ABRI is back loud and it is considered to hurt the ideals of reform.

The policy regarding the placement of the TNI in civilian positions is considered a political issue because this issue has re-emerged along with political momentum. In addition, the civil and military rules of the game will be visible from the system prevailing in certain countries. In Indonesia, which adheres to a democratic system, this system will describe a different thing from civilian control over the military and military control over civilians. The transition to democracy is so much that the key to maintaining democracy is strong civilian control over the military. Unfortunately, the transitional literature did not give birth to theories about the role of civil and military relations. Thus, this should be identified in-depth.

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